Causal inference in sensory cue combination is the process of determining whether multiple sensory cues have the same cause or different causes. Psychophysical evidence indicates that humans closely follow the predictions of a Bayesian causal inference model. Here, we explore how Bayesian causal inference could be implemented using probabilistic population coding and plausible neural operations, but conclude that the resulting architecture is unrealistic.
Introduction
The ventriloquist effect, whereby people misattribute a skilled performer's voice to a puppet (Howard and Templeton, 1966) , is sometimes described as an illusion arising from near-optimal cue combination (Alais and Burr, 2004; Banks, 2004) . The reasoning is that, because auditory localization is less precise (less reliable) than visual localization, the estimated location of origin of the speech will be closer to the visual than to the auditory event, leading the observer to attribute the speech to the puppet. If this cue integration explanation were correct, then the ventriloquist effect would occur even when the spatial disparity was large and the puppet's mouth movements would not match the performer's speech. However, in simplified experimental settings, ventriloquism breaks down at large spatial disparities (Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001; Wallace et al., 2004) , and experience with dubbed movies suggests that mis-matches in speech content reduce the illusion. In a more complete explanation of the ventriloquist effect, the observer first has to infer whether the auditory and the visual stimulus have a common cause and, only to the extent that they do, localize this cause at either the performer or the puppet. When disparity in space or speech content between auditory and visual signals is large, the observer will not believe that there is a common cause and simply perceives two separate events. Several years ago, two independent groups worked this idea out as a Bayesian model, called the causal inference model (Kording et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007) . In this model, which can be applied both to multisensory and to within-sensory cue combination, the observer computes the probability that the noisy measurements (cues) on a given trial were produced by the same cause (e.g. event location). The model provided a good fit to data from an experiment in which the subject reported whether a flash and a sound came from the same location or not (Kording et al., 2007; Wallace et al., 2004) . In particular, the model quantitatively described how the proportion of 'common cause' reports depended on the spatial disparity between the stimuli. The causal inference model also predicted estimates of either the auditory or the visual stimulus location. When the probability of a common cause equals 1, this component of the model reduces to the well-known Bayesian model for cue integration (Clark and Yuille, 1990; Trommershauser et al., 2011) . Thus, the causal inference model provides a more complete account of multisensory phenomenology than the cue integration model. Causal inference likely also plays a role in scene segmentation, whether visual (Shams and Beierholm, 2010) or auditory (Bregman, 1990) .
Although more behavioral experiments are needed to test the causal inference model, one theoretical challenge is clear: to determine how the computation of the probability of a common cause based on two noisy measurements can be implemented in neural circuitry. Less ambitiously, one might simply ask for a neural network to produce the same decision as the Bayesian model. However, it might be important for an organism to know not only whether a common cause was more likely than not, but also whether the probability of a common cause was, say, 51 or 99%. For example, if multiple pieces of information about the unity of the cause (say based on spatial disparity, based on temporal disparity, and based on speech content) had to be combined, then crucial information would be lost if each stream of information only outputted a 0 or a 1. Thus, we argue that not just the decision, but also the posterior probability of a common cause, must be accurately encoded.
Many proposals have been made for relating probability distributions to neural activity (Anastasio et al., 2000; Anderson, 1994; Barlow, 1969; Berkes et al., 2011; Deneve, 2008; Fiser et al., 2010; Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Jazayeri and Movshon, 2006; Ma et al., 2006; Pouget et al., 2003; Rao, 2004; Shi et al., 2010; Vilares and Kording, 2011; Zemel et al., 1998) . Here, we use the framework that has been most successful so far in offering plausible, self-consistent neural implementations of Bayesian computations (Beck et al., 2008 Ma et al., 2006 Ma et al., , 2011 . In this framework, called probabilistic population coding (Ma et al., 2006) , a population of neurons encodes a likelihood function of a world state variable on every trial. We will first review the formalisms of Bayesian causal inference and probabilistic population coding. We will then use the latter to construct a neural implementation of the former.
The Causal Inference Model
The causal inference model is a Bayesian model of perception that applies when the observer receives multiple measurements that may or may not have the same cause. We restrict ourselves here to the case of two measurements, meaning that the number of possible causes is 1 or 2. An example would be to determine whether or not a synchronous flash and sound came from a common location. We first specify the statistical structure of the task, also called the generative model (Fig. 1 ). For simplicity, we assume that the probability that there is one cause in the world, p(C = 1), equals 0.5, and so does, therefore, p(C = 2). When C = 1, the common cause is a stimulus whose value is drawn from a stimulus distribution, p(s). We assume this distribution is Gaussian with mean 0 and standard deviation σ s , because that will make the calculations easier. (Another convenient choice could be the uniform distribution, were it not that this distribution cannot be normalized on the entire real line, and limiting it to an interval would make it much less convenient.) The stimulus produces two conditionally independent measurements, denoted x 1 and x 2 , drawn from Gaussian distributions, both with mean s, but with potentially different standard deviations σ 1 and σ 2 , respectively. When C = 2, there are two stimuli, s 1 and s 2 , both drawn independently from the same distribution Figure 1 . Generative model of causal inference. Nodes represent variables, arrows conditional dependencies. The common-cause variable C is of interest to the observer. When C = 1 (common cause), s 1 equals s 2 . When C = 2 (different causes), s 1 and s 2 are independent. Independent Gaussian noise corrupts the scalar measurements x 1 and x 2 . In the neural version of this model, the measurements are replaced by population patterns of activity, r 1 and r 2 . p(s). Measurements x 1 and x 2 are then drawn from Gaussian distributions with means s 1 and s 2 , and standard deviations σ 1 and σ 2 , respectively. The next step in our modeling process is to derive the observer's decision rule. On a given trial, the observer receives measurements x 1 and x 2 and is interested whether or not they have a common cause, that is, whether C = 1 or C = 2. The Bayesian observer makes this decision by calculating the probabilities of both hypotheses, C = 1 and C = 2, based on the measurements and perfect knowledge of the generative model. These probabilities sum to 1 and can therefore be characterized by a single number. It is convenient to express them as a log posterior ratio:
Defining this ratio will simplify calculations and is convenient because the sign of d determines whether C = 1 or C = 2 is more probable. For example, if, on a given trial, C = 2 has twice the probability of
This is the logarithm of the ratio of the likelihoods of C = 1 and C = 2. We first consider p(x 1 , x 2 |C = 1), the probability of the measurements x 1 and x 2 if there is a common cause. Since we do not know the stimulus s, we have to take into account every possible value of s. The probability of x 1 and x 2 given C = 1 in combination with a particular s would be p(x 1 , x 2 |s)p(s|C = 1) = p(x 1 , x 2 |s)p(s). To find the total probability across all s, we integrate:
We now make use of the conditional independence of the measurements to write:
In this equation, p(x 1 |s) and p(x 2 |s) should be interpreted as functions of s: they express the sensory evidence on this trial and are called the likelihood functions of the stimulus. Thus, equation (3) expresses how the likelihood of C = 1 is computed from the likelihood functions of s.
We now turn to p(x 1 , x 2 |C = 2). The logic is analogous, except that we have to integrate over two stimulus variables, s 1 and s 2 :
As a result, the log posterior ratio is
After evaluating the integrals (see Appendix), this becomes
where we have introduced the notation
, and
for the three precision (reliability) variables. In Fig. 2 (a), we plot the log likelihood ratio as a color code against the measurements, x 1 and x 2 . The diagonal corresponds to trials on which the measurements happen to be identical to each other. The hypothesis C = 1 becomes more likely relative to C = 2 when a pair of measurements lies closer to the diagonal. This is intuitive: when two measurements are similar, they are likely to have a common cause. In addition, we observe that the farther from 0 such a pair of similar measurements lies, the more likely they are to have a common cause. This is because we chose a stimulus distribution that peaks at 0. Even when there are two causes, the two stimuli and therefore the two measurements will tend to both lie near 0 and therefore close to each other. When measurements lie close to each other but far from 0, this is harder to explain as a consequence of the stimulus distributions, and it is therefore more likely that they have a common cause. (This also shows that the value of σ s matters for the observer's decision.)
We model the final step in the decision process using a maximum-aposteriori (MAP) rule: the observer chooses the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability. Applying the MAP decision rule maximizes expected accuracy and is in that sense optimal. In our task, the MAP observer reports that there was a common cause when d is positive. The observer's confidence in the decision can then be measured as the absolute value of d. Thus, in Fig. 2(a) , the diagonal corners would correspond to high confidence in a 'common cause' decision (Ĉ = 1), and the off-diagonal ones to high confidence in a 'different causes' decision (Ĉ = 2).
Across many trials, we can compute the probability that the MAP observer reports 'common cause' (Ĉ = 1) as a function of the true stimuli on a given trial, which we denote s 1 and s 2 . This is equal to the probability that d is positive when x 1 and x 2 are generated by s 1 and s 2 , respectively. We performed Monte Carlo simulation to calculate this probability. This entails randomly drawing pairs of x 1 and x 2 from their respective distributions p(x 1 |s 1 ) and p(x 2 |s 2 ) and counting for what proportion of these draws d > 0 holds. The resulting probability of reporting 'common cause' is plotted as a function of stimulus disparity, s 2 − s 1 , in Fig. 2(b) . We see that the larger the disparity between the two stimuli, the less frequently the observer reports that there is a common cause. This matches with empirical findings and the model also offers a good quantitative fit (Kording et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007) .
The causal inference model has not yet been tested in situations where the reliabilities of one or both cues are varied unpredictably from trial to trial, as is done in some cue integration experiments (Alais and Burr, 2004; Ernst and Banks, 2002; Landy and Kojima, 2001) . Such unpredictable variations in reliability allow for a very strong test of the model, as they force the subject to take into account knowledge of σ 1 and σ 2 on every trial.
From a Behavioral to a Neural Model
The Bayesian model of causal inference outlined above is rather abstract: it largely regards the brain as a black box and simply represents observations as scalar variables following Gaussian distributions. While this model is adequate for describing behavior, it lacks mechanistic underpinnings. To find a neural implementation of the causal inference model, our starting point is that sensory information is represented in the brain through the spiking activity of populations of neurons. We then ask what kind of neural circuit can operate at the level of spike counts to produce behavior consistent with the Bayesian model and even compute, on each trial, the posterior probability of a common cause.
At the neural level, the observer's observations consist of a pattern of spike counts in a neural population, and the variability of this pattern across trials, for given stimuli, constitutes a generative model. We start by discussing a single population representing a stimulus. If r is the pattern of activity (a vector of spike counts, one for each neuron; Fig. 3 ), then p(r|s) quantifies the variability and is also called the noise distribution. For simplicity, we now assume that r is the activity in a population of independent Poisson neurons with Gaussian tuning curves; we will examine generalizations later. The tuning curve of the ith neuron is
where g is a scaling factor, called gain, that is the same for all neurons in the population; A i is this neuron's firing amplitude at unit gain; s pref,i is the neuron's preferred stimulus; and σ tc,i is the width of its tuning curve. We consider a general scenario in which stimulus reliability might change from trial to trial and affects neural population activity through gain, g (Ma et al., 2006) . We denote the distribution of gain by p(g). The noise distribution of the population for given g is:
We make the common assumption that i f i (s) is approximately independent of s, so that we can replace it by a constant K. We also substitute equation (7) for the tuning curves, to find:
As in the behavioral model, the Bayesian observer (equations (3) and (4)) uses the likelihood function of s to compute the likelihood and posterior over C.
The neural likelihood function of s is p(r|s) as a function of s (Fig. 3) . Since gain is a random variable, this likelihood function is computed by marginalizing (averaging) p(r|s, g) over gain:
Importantly, the integral over g does not contain the stimulus and is therefore a constant in the likelihood function of s. Working out the factor containing s, we can see that the likelihood function is an unnormalized Gaussian. This Gaussian has a mean
which is also the maximum-likelihood estimate. (Equation (9) does not hold when the population is completely silent. Then, the likelihood function is completely flat.) The inverse variance of the normalized likelihood function (a measure of its width) is 1
In equations (9) and (10), the weight vectors w pref and w tc are constants whose values are determined by the neurons' preferred stimuli and tuning widths. The inner product of these weight vectors with the spike counts of the neurons produces the maximum-likelihood estimate and likelihood width on a single trial. Biologically, these weights could be implemented as synaptic strengths. If the tuning curve width were independent of neuron, x would be the wellknown center-of-mass or population vector decoder. The symbols x and σ have been re-introduced for a reason: the likelihood function of s is now
which, up to the constant factorK which contains all s-independent factors, is identical to the likelihood function of s in the behavioral model. In other words, the scalar measurements x 1 and x 2 that we used before are the values where the neural likelihood functions over s 1 and s 2 , respectively, peak. We see in equation (10) that the inverse variance, 1/σ 2 , is encoded in the population as a weighted sum of the spike counts: this means that trial-to-trial variations in certainty could in principle be taken into account in downstream computation. Representing a neural likelihood function, such as the one in equation (11), in neural activity is known as probabilistic population coding (Ma et al., 2006) . We can now reformulate the causal inference model in neural terms. The cues are represented in two populations, r 1 and r 2 , each with their ownK, x, and σ 2 . The neural version of the log posterior ratio over C is:
Substituting equation (11) for both populations, we see that the constant factorsK 1 andK 2 drop out, implying that the distributions of the gains, p(g 1 ) and p(g 2 ), do not need to be known for the observer to be optimal. The log posterior ratio is identical to the one in the behavioral model, except that we have now made the identifications in equations (9) and (10). This means we can immediately jump to the final expression, equation (6), but now substitute equations (9) and (10) (w tc,1 · r 1 )(w pref,2 · r 2 ) 2 (w tc,2 · r 2 + J s )(w tc,1 · r 1 + w tc,2 · r 2 + J s )
where now all subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two populations, not to individual neurons. This complicated expression is the optimal neural decision variable for causal inference when neural activity is independent Poisson and tuning curves are Gaussian. We have made only one approximation, namely that i f i (s) is independent of s; other than that, this result is exact. Equation (12) also returns the correct answer when one or both populations are completely silent, namely d = 0.
In principle, one could implement causal inference with neurons by having neurons perform all operations in equation (12). The building blocks are four linear operations, so for convenience we let this preprocessing be done by four corresponding neurons: .
Each of the first three terms is a rational function of neural activities, with a polynomial of up to order 3 in the numerator and a polynomial of up to order 2 in the denominator. It is plausible that neurons can perform quadratic operations (Andersen et al., 1985; Ben Hamed et al., 2003; Boussaoud et al., 1993; Bremmer et al., 1997; Groh et al., 2001; Trotter et al., 1996) and therefore also multiplications. The division itself could be implemented using divisive normalization, which has been suggested to be widespread in cortex (Carandini and Heeger, 2011; Heeger, 1992 (14) and the optimal decision rule would be d approx > 0. To examine the goodness of this approximation, we performed a simulation.
Simulations
We simulated two input populations, each consisting of 100 independent Poisson neurons with Gaussian tuning curves, preferred stimuli s pref,i randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [−70, 70] , tuning curve widths σ tc,i randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [5, 35] , and normalized amplitudes A i randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A typical set of tuning curves is shown in Fig. 4(a) . The probability of a common cause was 0.5. We chose the stimulus distribution to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 10. We verified that the assumption that i f i (s) is approximately independent of s is satisfied over the relevant range [−30, 30] . Gain g was drawn independently for both populations from a gamma distribution with mean 1 and scale parameter 3. This means that the reliability of each stimulus varied unpredictably from trial to trial. We simulated 100 000 trials. On each trial, we computed the log posterior ratio using equation (12). The histogram of each of the four terms in that expression separately across all trials is shown in Fig. 4(b) . Visually, it appears that the fourth terms vary less than the other three. Indeed, averaged across 10 runs of 10 5 trials each, the standard deviations of the four terms were 5.22, 2.48. 3.63, and 0.37, respectively. This justifies approximating the fourth term by its trial average. This approximation leads to a decent approximation of the posterior probability of C = 1 (Fig. 4(c) ). The 'distance' between the optimal posterior and the approximate posterior can be quantified by the KullbackLeibler divergence (Cover and Thomas, 1991) . We quantified information loss as the ratio of the trial-averaged Kullback-Leibler divergence to the mutual information between C and neural activity Ma et al., 2011) . For the parameters chosen and averaged over 20 runs, the information loss due to the approximation of the fourth term was 12%. Decisions based on d approx coincided with decisions based on d on 91% of trials, and thus, the accuracy of the approximate observer was nearly the same as that of the optimal observer. By contrast, when we approximate any of the first three terms by its trial average, the approximation is extremely poor. For example, approximating the first term yields an information loss of 1600%, a coincidence rate of only 57%, and a drop in observer accuracy from 71 to 53%. Returning to the approximation of the fourth term, the probability of reporting a common cause is shown as a function of stimulus disparity in Fig. 4(d) for the optimal and approximate observer. As can also be seen in Fig. 4(c) , the approximate observer reports, at every disparity, a common cause more often than the optimal observer. (Note that smaller disparities are more common than bigger ones.) All quantitative results reported here are specific to the parameters chosen, but the qualitative conclusions are robust under changes in parameters. We expect that in practice, when parameters have to be fitted to subject data, it is very difficult to distinguish between the optimal and the approximate strategy.
Generalizations
Some of our assumptions are easily generalized. Using a prior probability of a common cause different from 0.5 would simply introduce another constant term in the log posterior ratio. Another generalization is from independent Poisson variability to the exponential family with linear sufficient statistics (Ma et al., 2006) , which allows for Fano factors different from 1, continuous firing rates, tuning curves of arbitrary shapes, and correlated noise between neurons. The expression for such variability, also called Poisson-like variability, is
It is easily verified that equation (8) is a special case. For Poisson-like variability, like for independent Poisson variability with constant i f i (s), the distribution over gain g is irrelevant for the optimal decision rule. The final effect of generalizing to Poisson-like variability would only be that the linear weights in equation (13) would change.
Circuit
The computation in equation (14) can, in principle, be realized using the circuit diagram in Fig. 5 , which contains three types of operations: linear combinations, quadratic nonlinearities and multiplications (counted as one type because ab = ((a + b) 2 − a 2 − b 2 )/2), and divisive normalization. This results in a network that can, on each trial, reproduce, in good approximation, not only the optimal decision (the sign of d) but also decision confidence (the absolute value of d), even as the reliabilities of the two stimuli are unequal and vary unpredictably from trial to trial. Although the network in Fig. 5 implements near-optimal causal inference, we mostly view it as an exposition of the limitations of a naïve probabilistic population coding approach than as a plausible circuit to look for in the brain. First, it is unclear how a complex network like this can be learned in limited time using biologically plausible learning rules. Second, in spite of the complexity of the network proposed here, it can only handle causal inference on two stimuli. If one were to take this approach for inferring whether a larger number of stimuli have a common cause (Wozny et al., 2008) , the number of operations needed would increase faster than linearly in the number of stimuli. Third, implementing a somewhat different but closely related task like same-different judgment, where in the C = 2 condition stimuli are drawn from a distribution around a common but trial-dependent mean , would ostensibly call for an entirely different circuit. Thus, our approach seems insufficiently general. Finally, causal inference does Figure 5 . Circuit diagram of a network that can approximate the posterior probability of a common cause using linear combinations, quadratic operations, and divisive normalization. Input is assumed Poisson-like. not only entail the computation of the probability of a common cause. In many cue combination tasks, a stimulus has to be estimated while the observer does not know whether or not there is a common cause (Kording et al., 2007) . This would add another layer of complexity beyond the computation of the posterior of C discussed here. To illustrate this: the mean of the posterior distribution of the first stimulus, s 1 , is a weighted average of the posterior mean under the hypothesis that there is a common cause and the posterior mean under the hypothesis that there is not, with weights given by the posterior probabilities of C = 1 and C = 2:
Naively substituting equations (9), (10), and (14) would give rise to an unmanageably complex expression.
Discussion
The question how Bayesian computation is implemented in the brain is a central one in systems neuroscience. In previous work, we showed that optimal cue integration (with C always equal to 1) can, in a probabilistic population coding framework, be implemented using linear operations (Beck et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2006) . The simplicity of these operations is one of the most appealing aspects of the framework. However, many generative models are much more complex than that of cue integration. A large part of this complexity is due to the presence of confounding or intermediate variables that need to be averaged out, such as the stimulus variables in equations (3) and (4). In earlier work, it was shown that this averaging process, called marginalization, can be implemented using a combination of three basic constituent elements: linear operations, quadratic operations, and divisive normalization Ma et al., 2011) . Here we have seen another example of such an implementation. Conceptually, this approach still very attractive, since prevalent operations in cortex, namely quadratic operations and divisive normalization, are linked to a prevalent operation in Bayesian inference, namely marginalization. However, for causal inference, we needed a large number of specific combinations of the constituent elements to realize the optimal decision rule, making the resulting architecture highly unrealistic. This is not due to excessive complexity of the generative model, but to our approach of literally translating the Bayesian decision rule, equation (6), to a neural rule using the 'dictionary' of equations (9) and (10).
A more promising direction, still using probabilistic population codes, might be to use variational methods (Bishop, 2006) , to construct neural circuits that not only require fewer operations but are also more generally applicable. Instead of having one circuit for each task, it is likely that the brain employs general-purpose, heuristic inference machinery that can perform nearoptimally in a large palette of related tasks, with only minor task-specific adjustments. Thus, the task-specific approach we took here might soon be superseded by a search for neural implementations of canonical approximate inference algorithms. Alternatively, frameworks other than probabilistic population codes (Anastasio et al., 2000; Anderson, 1994; Barlow, 1969; Berkes et al., 2011; Deneve, 2008; Fiser et al., 2010; Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Jazayeri and Movshon, 2006; Rao, 2004; Shi et al., 2010; Zemel et al., 1998) might be able to provide biologically plausible approximations to optimal inference in tasks that require marginalization, but none have so far.
The Integral of the Product of Gaussians
Let p 1 (x), . . . , p N (x) be a set of N Gaussian probability density functions over x, with respective means μ 1 , . . . , μ N , and standard deviations σ 1 , . . . , σ N . The integral over the real line of the product of these Gaussians can be evaluated as
